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COMMENTS
CONDITIONAL SALES - REMEDIES OF THE SELLER IN FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION
Installment buying has opened to millions of consumers the possibility
of acquiring things which they have wanted and could not otherwise have
acquired. In Florida, as well as the rest of the nation, installment selling
is as much a part of the economic life as banking and farming. It has
been deeply woven into our economic fabric by many years of increasingly
widespread use.1
By far the majority of installment sales in the State of Florida involve
transactions in which security is taken or title reserved by the seller for the
payment of the purchase price. 2 This security is taken in one of several
forms. Most popular is the conditional sales contract.3
A few states, mainly because of early judicial prejudice against the
conditional sales contract, favor the use of the chattel mortgage to secure
payment of deferred balances.4  But the chattel mortgage does not give the
seller as much flexibility for protecting his interest as does the conditional
sale. Consequently, the amount of goods sold conditionally is reflected
in the increased use of this form of installment buying.
This widely used financing method is crystallized in a structure built
of legal rules and contractual provisions. It is a method of installment
selling whereby the retail seller assumes the burden of carrying the credit
of the buyer until the remainder of the purchase price is paid in periodic
installments.5  The credit arrangements embody an agreement which pro-
vides for retention of title in the seller as security until some condition,
usually complete payment, is fulfilled." The purchaser, after agreeing to
the basic terms, signs an elaborate contract providing for conditions which
restrict his beneficial use and privileges of resale. Occasionally it provides
that even if the buyer is not in arrears but should impair his credit standing
the seller would be able to declare the buyer in default. The conditional
seller achieves his advantage, not from these elaborate provisions, but from
the basic nature of the instrument.
In Florida, where the distinctions between a conditional sales contract
1. Nugent and Henderson, Installment Selling and the Consumer: A Brief for
Regulation, 173 ANNALS 93 (1934).
2. Donaldson, Ar Analysis of Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 19 RoexY MT.
L. REV. 135 (1947).
3. Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 H-Av. L. REv. 588
(1949).
4. Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921); Barber Asphalt Paving
Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 153, 46 So. 193 (1908).
5. Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. 1. McCaskill Co., 59 Fla. 322, 51 So. 547 (1910)
(payment plus a mortgage on other property); Alden v. W. 1. Dyer and Bro., 92 Minn.
134, 99 N.W. 784 (1904) (payment of ptuchase price plus agreement not to sell or
remove property without seller's consent); Union Machine and Supply Co. v. Thompson,
98 Xash. 119, 167 Pac. 95 (1917) (payment of purchase price plus an old debt).
6. Edwards v. Baldwin Piano Co., 79 Fla. 143, 83 So. 915 (1920).
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and a chattel mortgage are observed,7 it becomes necessary to point out
that the sale or credit with a chattel mortgage back to secure payment of
the purchase price is a similar device widely used to accomplish a credit
transaction. It should not be confused with a conditional sale as it gives
the seller different rights and remedies in the event the buyer defaults.
The typical characteristics of a conditional sale which differentiate it from
a chattel mortgage are:
(I) The conditional sale provides that the title of the goods
is to remain in the seller' until the happening of a named condition
when it is to vest in the buyer.9 This results in a division of the
attributes of ownership. The buyer receives immediate possession
of the goods and the right to continue in possession until he
defaults. The seller, by force of the title-retaining feature of the
contract, has legal title to the goods'0 and the contractual right to
recover the purchase price" or the goods.
(2) Possession is delivered to the buyer at once.
In the chattel mortgage, title passes immediately to the buyer
subject to a lien. The agreement takes the form of a conveyance
with a chattel mortgage back which can be satisfied by the payment
of the purchase price. 12 Thus a chattel mortgage assumes title in
the mortgagor, the mortgage creating a specific lien. It is not a
conveyance of legal title nor of the right to possession.'8
The distinction is important because: (a) The Florida recording acts
require that a chattel mortgage be recorded, but no such requirement is
imposed upon a conditional sales contract.' 4 (b) The usury laws apply to
interest on a loan 15 but not to carrying charges added to the price.' 0
(c) Finally, there are remedies available to the seller.' 7 It is these remedies
which will be discussed.
DOcrRINE OF ELECTION
A choice of remedies is available to the credit seller under a conditional
sales contract upon the buyer's default. The seller may, at his option,S
bring an action to recover the purchase price, replevy the goods, resort to
self-help,'0 or go into a court of equity to establish a lien on the property
for the unpaid portion of the purchase price.20  These remedies if properly
7. Voges v. 'Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785 (1929).
8. Stokes v. Humphries, 69 Fla. 468, 68 So. 448 (1915).
9. Southern Hardware and Supply Co. v. Clark, 201 Fed. 1 (5th Cir. 1912).
10. The risk is on the purchaser for loss of goods. United States v. Greenwood
Products Co., 87 F.Supp. 785 (N.D Fla. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1951).
11. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 59 Fla. 590, 52 So. 799 (1910).
12. WVALSn, A TREATISE ON MORTAGES, 35 (1934).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. McKais v. Commercial Credit Corp., 126 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1942).
15. FLA. STAT. § 687.09 (1951).
16. FrA. STAT. § 687.02 (1951).
17. Pavhls v. Atlas-Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 126 Fla. 808, 172 So. 57 (1937).
18. Nelson v. Watson, 114 Fla. 806, 155 So. 101 (1933).
19. Commercial Credit Co. v. Neal, 91 Fla. 505, 107 So. 639 (1926).
20. Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677 (1926).
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understood and used, will provide the seller with a greater amount of
protection than is available under any other type of modern credit arrange-
ment. These advantages will be lost 2' if the seller does not make proper
use of his remedies. This is true because, should the seller choose a remedy
not adequately covering his particular situation, he will have made an
election 2 which will operate as a waiver of other remedies. This election
may benefit the defaulting buyer.
The election principle is followed in Florida.23 The seller, where the
rights of a bona-fide third party 24 have not intervened,2 must elect 6 to
pursue one of three inconsistent remedies. These remedies will be con-
sidered separately and in some detail below. From the outset the reader
must be aware of the election-of-remedies hazard which attends the seller's
initial choice of remedy. The seller has an optional legal remedy either
to proceed in replevin, or, if the contract provides, to resort to self-help.27
He may also look to the buyer's personal obligation and recover the purchase
price. The seller cannot treat the remedies as cumulative. He must choose
one or the other.28  In Florida, as in most common law jurisdictions, when
the seller has elected to sue for the recovery of the debt; he thereby affirms
the sale. He waives his right to repossess the property, and title to the
property vests absolutely in the buyer.20  Similarly, should the seller elect to
repossess, he has rescinded the contract80 and given up his right to recover
the purchase price.31 These remedies are concurrent with those provided
for in the contract which are not inconsistent with public policy. 2
The typical conditional sales contract usually involves, comparatively
speaking, little money. Because of this, few decisions concerning the
nature of the conditional sales contract emanate from the Supreme Court of
Florida. However, examination of conditional sales decisions in other
common law states demonstrates some of the consequences of the election
doctrine. In Arkansas, as in Florida, when the seller brings an action of
21. Weeke v. Reeve, 65 Fla. 374, 61 So. 749 (1913).
22. American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So.
942 (1908).
23. Kauffman v. International Harvester Co., 153 Fla. 188, 14 So.2d 387 (1943);
Commercial Credit Co. v. Miller, 111 Fla. 554, 149 So. 482 (1935); Robertson v. North-
ern Motor Security Co., 105 Fla. 644, 142 So. 226 (1932).
24. Commercial Credit Co. v. Parker, 101 Fla. 928, 132 So. 640 (1931); Kent v.
Polk Grocery Co., 131 Fla. 139, 179 So. 136 (1938); Glass v. Continental Guaranty
Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Onyx Soda Fountain Co. v. L'Engle, 53 Fla.
314, 43 So. 771 (1907).
25. Nash Miami Motors v. Bandel, 160 Fla. 925, 37 So.2d 366 (1948); Marriott v.
Meadows, 138 Fin. 436, 189 So. 415 (1939).
26. The election must be made within a reasonable time. Universal Credit Co. v.
McKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932).
27. Jasper v. Tuten, 62 Fla. 151, 57 So. 237 (1911).
28. See note 7 sura.
29. Pavlis v. Atlas.Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 126 F1n. 808, 172 So. 57 (1937).
30. Ibid.
31. EACER, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTCAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES AND TRUST
RECEIPTS, §§ 403, 408 (1941)
32. Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931).
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replevin to recover the goods from the defaulting buyer, he waives his right
to sue on the unpaid purchase-money notes, 33  Peaceable repossession of
the goods by the seller after default by the buyer also bars an action by the
seller for the purchase price.34 An assignee of the purchase-money notes
cannot bring an action to recover from the buyer-maker if the assignee has
assented to a repossession of the goods by the seller.8 5 Florida allows equity
to take jurisdiction over the conditional sales contract and establish a lien
in favor of the seller which, like the chattel mortgage, can be foreclosed.36
On the equitable remedy the doctrine of election also applies, and the seller
is barred from pursuing his other remedies. 1
Actions for purchase price
When the seller retains the title until payment is made in full,", he
confers upon himself an absolute right to the purchase price, and imposes
upon the buyer an unconditional obligation to pay. 9 The seller must show
that he does not assert an absolute title to the goods since that would be
inconsistent with an action to recover the purchase price. 40 He must show
that all but his security title has passed to the buyer. However, the seller
does not have to make a tender of title since, as holder of the buyer's note,
he cannot be called on to execute a bill of sale before the agreed consid-
eration has been paid.41 Most conditional sales contracts provide for this
contingency by including acceleration provisions. 42 Upon default of an
installment payment the seller can then elect tosue for the recovery of his
debt. This election waives his rights to repossess the property43 and title
vests absolutely in the 'buyer, 44 who then becomes a debtor for the
remainder of the purchase price. This rule applies even though the con-
tract contains provisions either authorizing the seller to bring suit for the
purchase price without waiving the right to pursue the property, or pro-
viding that the title will remain in the seller until the judgment is paid.
33. Gale and Co. v. Wallace. 210 Ark. 161, 194 S.W.2d 881 (1946); 11. V. Beasley
Music Co. v. Cash, 164 Ark. 572, 262 S.W. 656 (1924).
34. Walcott v. Fuller, 118 Conn. 220, 171 Atl. 698 (1934); contra: 20th Cent.
Machinery Co. v. Excelsior Springs Water Co., 273 Mo. 142, 200 S.WX. 1079 (1917).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Livingston v. National Shawmut Banuk of Boston, 62 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1953).
37. Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 739, 109 So. 677, 692 (1926).
38. Payment in purchase-money notes does not make the sale absolute. Lakeland
Silox Brick Co. v. Jackson and Church Co., 124 Fla. 347, 168 So. 411 (1936).
39. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 59 Fla. 590, 52 So. 799 (1910).
40. Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677 (1926).
41. United States v. Bryant, 58 F.Supp. 663 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff'd 157 F.2d 767
(5th Cir. 1946).
42. Kauffman v. International Harvester Co., 153 Fla. 188, 14 So.2d 387 (1943).
43. Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785 (1929).
44. American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So.
942 (1908).
45. Commercial Credit Co. v. Miller, 111 Fla. 554, 149 So. 482 (1933).
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Such provisions are void in Florida, 46 and an election takes place in spite
of them even though the suit is dropped before final judgment.47
The parties may agree to treat notes given in payment as not waiving
the retention of title until the notes are paid. They may also agree that
the seller does not waive his title should he take new or additional security
(e.g., a mortgage on property other than that sold). 48 Generally speaking,
a conditional sales contract is not changed to one of absolute sale 49 by the
fact that the buyer gives notes whereby he promises unconditionally to
pay the purchase price.50
Successful actions on the purchase price are often followed by seizure
of the goods, under a writ of execution, and sale by the sheriff.51 This gives
the seller some of the advantages of having both repossession and his con-
tractual obligation. While this procedure does not entitle the seller to a
return of the goods, it does enable him to realize the purchase price, or a
part thereof, out of a sale of the very goods which he regarded as his
security at the outset of the transaction. A graphic illustration of enforcing
payment of price without proper realization of its effect is found in the
case of Central Farmers Trust Co. v. McCampbell Furniture Stores.12 The
seller sued on the notes. He was not allowed to claim priority over a mort-
gagee whose prior mortgage deed contained an after-acquired property
provision. The seller's action on the notes operated to pass title to the
buyer, whereupon the furniture became subject to the prior lien. The seller
probably would use this form of remedy only where the goods have depre-
ciated so greatly in value that repossession would not be worthwhile. An
action for the purchase price is based on a contractual obligation between
the seller and the buyer and is subject to all available defenses to a con-
tract. An advantage of this remedy is the possibility of a specific attach-
ment. 53 Caution must be used since nonconformance to the statutory
attachment provisions might lead to penalties54 and leave the seller without
a remedy because of the election hazard.
Repossession
The fundamental remedy under a conditional sales contract is the
right of the seller to recover possession of the chattel upon the buyer's default.
This right can be exercised only if the seller has not waived his title in the
46. See note 43 supra.
47. Intertype Corp. v. Pulver, 2 F.Supp. 4 (S.D. Fla. 1932), aff'd 65 F.2d 419(5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied 290 U.S. 660 (1933).
48. Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. I. McCaskill Co., 59 Fla. 322, 51 So. 547 (1910).
49. Percifield v. State, 93 Fla. 247, 111 So. 519 (1927).
50. Campbell Printing-Press and Mfg. Co. v. Walker, 22 Fla. 412, 1 So. 59 (18861.
51. FLA. STAT., C. 55-(1951).
52. 127 Fla. 721, 174 So. 748 (1937).
53. If deterioration is imminent the court cah order a sale quickly. FLA. STAT.§ 76.22 (1951).
54. Attachment must be had on the statutory grounds or the seller will be liable for
damages. Also an attachment bond, double the debt and covering all costs and damages
must be raised. FLA. STAT. §§ 76.04, 76.05, 76.12 (1951).
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chattel. 5  In Florida the matter is unaffected by statute. Conduct by the
seller, after knowledge of the buyer's default, 0 showing an intent 7 not to
rely on the reserved title operates as a waiver of title in the seller and
affirms title in the buyer.58 The seller, by this waiver, continues to treat the
contract as being in force after defaults in payment. 9  Such conduct must
be clearly inconsistent 0 with the seller's title before it will act as a waiver
of his right to repossess.6' The taking of purchase money notes evidencing
the unpaid price0 2 or the taking of an additional security on other prop-
erty 3 are not the types of conduct inconsistent with a conditional sale.
Only acts, such as the institution of a suit for the purchase price recog-
nizing the existence of title in the buyer, 4 operates as a waiver, even though
it is voluntarily abandoned,"5 or is not successfully prosecuted.66  An
assertion of a lien upon the property is another act inconsistent with the
seller's title.67
It should be particularly noted that, in those conidtional sales agree-
nients which have attributes of both the conditional sale and the chattel
mortgage, the courts easily find waivers."" This occurs when the seller
asserts the mortgage lien and receives an adverse decision, i.e., that the
instrument is not a mortgage but a conditional sales contract. He cannot
thereafter replevy the goods since he has waived his title. This result is
reached because the relation of conditional seller and conditional buyer,
and of mortgagee and mortgagor, cannot subsist as to the same property
at the same time. The relation of the parties must be one or the other -
it cannot be both. The theory is that it is manifestly inconsistent that title
remain in the seller"" when he implies it is in the buyer in his action on the
chattel mortgage. This situation, and others where the court has found
a waiver,"° are explained by the fact that the court attempts to avoid the
55. See note 47 supra.
56. McKinnon v. Johnson, 59 Fa. 332, 52 So. 288 (1910).
57. Mere forbearance to elect a remedy on first default is not a waiver. Universal
Credit Co. v. McKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932).
58. There is no waiver in the states where the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
is adopted. Defiance Mach. Works v. Gill, 170 Wis. 477, 175 N.W. 940 (1920).
59. Universal Credit Co. v. McKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932).
60. Taking additional security by way of a chattel mortgage does not affect the
seller's reservation of title. Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. J. McCaskill Co., 59 FI. 322,
51 So. 547 (1910).
61. Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 789 (1929).
62. Bailey v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 268 (1915).
63. See note 47 supra.
64. Frish v. Wells, 200 Mass. 429, 431, 86 N.E. 775, 776 (1909).
65. McKinnon v. Johnson, 59 Fla. 332, 52 So. 288 (1910); Weeke v. Reeve,
65 Fla. 374, 61 So. 749 (1913); Campbell v. Kauffman Milling Co., 42 Fla. 328,
29 So. 435 (1900).
66. See note 47 supra.
67. Robb v. Ves, 155 U.S. 4, 13 (1894).
68. Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785 (1929) (suit on unmatured notes4 .69. Central Farmers' Trust Co. v. McCampbcll Furniture Stores, 128 Fla. 6,
174 So. 748 (1937).
70. Anderson v. Tradlock, 27 Ala. App. 513, 175 So. 412 (1937).
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possibility of a forfeiture.71 Waiver is the inevitable consequence of the
forfeiture rule which allows the seller to keep the buyer's installments after
default.7 2 This is shown by the court's refusal to apply the waiver doctrine
on the ground that no forfeiture is involved where the seller sues for the
purchase price rather than for possession.
The conditional seller should be aware of the possibility of a partial
waiver before he seeks to repossess. A partial waiver of title will prevent
repossesion until the seller takes steps to end it, or when the next install-
ment comes due.7 Should the seller repossess during this period he will
be liable to the buyer for conversion. If the seller extends the time of
payment 74 he will be precluded from repossessing before the expiration76
of the new time limit because the seller's act is inconsistent with his title.77
He has waived the right of forfeiture for default. In contracts containing
acceleration clauses, extension of the time of payment of the installment
also waives the right to immediate repossession. 8 These waivers can only
be corrected by the seller giving notice or making a demand before repos-
sessing.09 In such a case, tender of the amount remaining due is sufficient
to retain in the buyer the right of possession. Before the waiver, the seller
could have repossessed without the necessity of a demand.80
If the seller has not waived his title he may repossess." In Florida
repossession results in an election and affirmation of title in the seller.
The result of this election will be to preclude the seller from thereafter
maintaining an action to recover the purchase price or any part of it
remaining unpaid 2 or any other action which recognizes title in the buyer.83
The seller cannot, for example, foreclose his lien or foreclose a mortgage
on lands securing the purchase price. 4
With these consequences in mind, the seller has two methods of
recovering possession. He may either retake by self help or bring an
71. Pound, The Progress of the Law 1918-1919: Equity, 33 HARV. L. REv. 929,
952 (1920).
72. Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931).
73. Kent v. Tallahassee Motor Co., 141 IIa. 789, 193 So. 821 (1940).
74. Mere delay in making an election of remedies is not a partial waiver. Universal
Credit Co. v. MeKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932).
75. Repossession will not be denied when the seller redelivers to the buyer after
payments are resumed. Commercial Credit Co. v. Miller, 111 Fla. 554, 149 So, 482
(1933).
76. Commercial Credit Co. v. Willis, 126 Fla. 449, 171 So. 304 (1936).
77. Even in the absence of an acceleration clause the seller may declare the remain-
ing installments due and sue for the purchase price. Kanffman v. International -larvester
Co,, 153 Fla. 188, So.2d 387 (1943).
78. See note 73 supra.
79. See note 76 supra.
8fl. Id. at 306, 307.
81. Universal Credit Co. v. MeKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932).
82. See note 72 supra.
83. Jackson v. A. W. Wade Mfg. Co., 102 Fla. 1032, 136 So. 689 (1931).
84. Percifield v. State, 93 Fla. 247, Ill So. 519 (1927).
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action in replevin. The privilege to retake may be exercised without recourse
to the courts.85
Repossession by self help
Before the conditional seller resorts to the remedy of retaking, he
should be aware of the common law approach followed by the Florida
courts. The seller cannot use any physical force to retake the chattel without
the consent of the buyer.8 6 Similarly, he is prevented from entering upon
another's land to retake without permission of the landowner.87 Thus,
the conditional seller is required to obtain prior consent in the conditional
sales contract before he will have the right to retake over the objection
of the purchaser. Such a clause will not be implied in the contract.88 As a
result, all standard conditional sales contracts contain a clause giving the
seller the right to retake without process of law, and these clauses are valid
in Florida.89 They give the seller a right to retake without being liable for
conversion or trespass, since the legal title and the consent given in the
contract are sufficient to give the seller the immediate right to possession
upon default. 0
Generally speaking, repossession by retaking is strictly interpreted in
light of the contract provisions. If the contract requires a demand, it must
be made.91 Only if so authorized by the contract may the seller repossess
without giving notice. 2 Even if notice is not required the seller will be
allowed to retake only if he can do so without committing a breach of the
peace 8 or committing an unlawful trespess. 4 This occurs when the seller
fails to distinguish between his rights arising from the contract and his duty
not to invade the general rights of the buyer existing apart from the con-
tract.15 If his acts are unreasonable he is liable for damages.9 6 Notwith-
standing provisions waiving the requirement of notice or demand, the seller
must not attempt to reposess after he has been expressly denied the right
by the person in lawful possession. Such action constitutes a trespass.97
No matter what wording is followed in these clauses the common law
jurisdictions will invalidate any terms9d which would give rise to force or
violence naturally calculated to provoke a breach of the peace in the retak-
85. C.I.T. Corporation v. Reeves, 112 Fla. 428, 150 So. 638 (1933).
86. See note 84 supra.
87. PROSSER, TORTS 145 (1st ed. 1941).
88. See note 85 supra.
89. Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785 (1929).
90. Universal Credit Co. v. McKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778, 780 (1932);
Commercial Credit Co. v. Ned, 91 Fla. 505, 107 So. 639 (1926).
91. Young v. Corbitt Motor Truck Co., 148 S.C. 511, 146 S.E. 534 (1929).
92. See note 85 upra.
93. See note 84 supra.
94. Ibid.
95. Id. at 639.
96. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N.E. 793 (1911).
97. C.I.T. Corp. v Brewer, 146 Fa. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941).
98. Girard Y. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934).
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* ing of the property.90 Following this general rule, such actions will preclude
the seller from exercising his right to retake the property. 100 This is par-
ticularly important since actions which would forfeit the seller's right to
retake (e.g., a non-peaceful attempt at repossession) will make him liable
for unlawful taking of the goods in addition to trespass and breach of the
peace,' 0'
There has been no specific Florida case to the effect that any entry or
retaking must be made at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
However, jurisdictions that the Florida court followed in their earlier deci-
sions in this field now hold that surreptitious entry, or one made in the
absence of the buyer, is unreasonable.' 2 It is also unreasonable to remove
anything which might cause physical injury, e.g., removing the only bed of
a buyer when he is ill.O 3 These jurisdictions express the realization that
some evils arising from unconscionable acts of the seller (removing the only
stove from the buyer's cabin in the middle of winter) might be too harsh.' 0'
It is to be hoped that the Florida court, when called upon, will also modify
some of the extreme harshness that is possible under the present exercise
of this remedy.
The problem has arisen in other jurisdictions as to whether the con-
ditional seller can exercise this remedy when the chattel has been attached
to some other property.10 5 The prevailing common law view is that the
parties know at the time of the sale that the seller may have to repossess.' 06
It is held that the seller has the right to use whatever force is reasonably
necessary in order to remove his chattel.1'7 The liability of a seller for
excessive damage depends upon whether the court adopts the rule that a
condition precedent to the right of retaking is a reasonable exercise of the
right,'0 8 or the rule that the seller is liable only for injury in excess of what
was necessary to recapture the chattel.' 0"
In no case may the seller use force against the person of the buyer
when the latter wrongfully resists repossession. 10 If the conditional buyer
resists and places his body in a position which obstructs the seller so that
in order to take the chattel he must necessarily apply force to the person,
99. See note 84 suora.
100. Crews v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 68 So. 287, 288 (1915),
101. Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293. 184 So. 439 (1938).
102. Evers-Jordan Furn. Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Fla. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939).
103. Dury v. Herney, 126 Mass. 519 (1879).
104. Comment, 36 CEo. L. J. 411, 444 (1948).
105. Commercial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 98 Fla. 410, 123 So. 814(1929.104. Jones v. Greenspoon's Son Pipe Co., 381 Ill. 615, 46 N.E.2d 67 (1943).
107. Justus v. Universal Credit Co., 189, S.C. 487, 1 S.E.2d 508 (1939).
108. Sonlios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 175 SE.2d 869 (1941)
109. Westerman v. Oregon Automobile Credit Co., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P.2d 435(1942).
110. Silverstin v. Kohler and Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 183 Pac. 451 (1919). See
Annotations, 105 A.L.R. 926 (1936), 9 A.L.R. 1180 (1920).
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however slight, then he must desist and resort to legal process."' The reason
for this rule is that to allow use of any force against the buyer invites brawls,
and sanctions settlement of differences by force. The economic advantage
of this remedy lies in the elimination of the added expense of litigation
that would result if the seller were forced to resort to legal process in order
to recover his goods. This advantage is so slight that the abuses the rule
promotes should cause its final elimination from the legal system. Replevin
is the proper remedy to recover possession. 112
Replevin
The action of replevin is the remedy most frequently used by the
conditional seller in Florida. 1 3 This action was extended to cover con-
ditional sales contracts at an early date. Although this remedy is entirely
governed by statute," 4 the election doctrine applies"" and certain basic
conditions must be complied with before the seller can proceed."' To
sustain the action the buyer must have actual or constructive possession or
control of the property, and the seller must be entitled to the immediate
possession thereof when the action is brought. He exercises a retention of
title by the election to replcvy. 1" 7 The right to possession can be acquired
upon default by a demand, but the usual situation requires no demand.
In the leading case of Evans v, Kloepell,"8s the court carefully pointed out
that no demand is necessary where the buyer's possession was lawfully
acquired and the seller claims ownership; or where the buyer by his own
act or default converts the property, or where by the terms of a valid
contract the default of the buyer confers upon the seller the right of
possession." 9  Every carefully drawn conditional sales contract includes
these provisions. If the contract fails to include the above provisions the
seller merely puts up a bond which shows a prima facie assertion of title
to the property in dispute. In any event, where the seller is entitled to
possession of the conditionally sold property because of default and demands
the property before institution of the replevin suit, the buyer will be guilty
of unlawful detention of the property, 20 at least from the date the suit was
instituted.' There can be no defense of limitations if the seller inter-
111. Lamb v. Woodry, 154 Ore. 30, 58 P.2d 1257 (1936). See Annotation,
105 A.L.R. 914 (1936).
112. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Core, 118 Fla. 889, 160 So. 481 (1935).
113. Stokes v. Humphries, 69 Fla. 468, 68 So. 448 (1915).
114. FLA. STAT., c. 78 (1951).
115. Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931).
116. Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. J. McCaskill Co., 59 Fla. 322, 51 So. 547 (1910).
117. Commercial Credit Co. v. Miller, 111 Fla. 554, 149 So. 482 (1933).
118. 72 Fla. 267, 73 So. 180 (1916).
119. See note 105 supra.
120. The buyer cannot set off payments against damages. Evans v. Kloeppel, 72
Fla. 267, 73 So. 180 (1916).
121. Pavlis v. Atlas-Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 126 Fla. 808, 172 So. 57 (1937).
COMMENTS
mittently gets the buyer to acknowledge his right to repossess.2 2 This can
be accomplished, of course, by demanding payment periodically.
When the contract is assigned, the assignee can either retake the
property' 28 or look to the assignor for the remainder of the purchase price.1 24
The buyer has no right to withhold possession.' 25  Mere assignment of the
purchase money notes for the purpose of collecting a portion of the note
is not enough of a transfer of title to support an action for replevin. 26 If
the buyer assigns his interest, his assignee will be liable on resale for any
deficiency, notwithstanding the general rule that the conditional seller may
not enforce the debt for the purchase price after retaking possession. 127
The seller can replevy only the specific goods which he has sold to the
buyer,12 and if the buyer has traded them to someone else the seller can
replevy from him. As long as the seller does not agree to a transfer there
can be no estoppel, waiver, or abandonment of his right against the buyer. 129
After the seller does repossess, whether by self help or by replevin, he
can keep the payments of the buyer by way of forfeiture.8 ° If the payments
by the buyer have been substantial, repossession may result in a forfeiture
of the type against which equity grants relief in the case of mortgages of
real and personal property. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act has obvi-
ated the difficulty by requiring the seller to offer the goods at public sale
for the buyer's account if more than fifty percent has been paid;' 3' but
this point has never been developed in the common law of this state.
Instead, it sometimes benefits the seller to include a resale provision in the
contract' 82 so that he can dispose of the goods (usually of little value after
the buyer's use) and hold the buyer for a deficiency. Under repossession
and resale provisions providing that the buyer should pay any deficiency in
the event of resale, the buyer has an action 'on the common counts for
money had and received, and on a special count stating the express con-
tract for any surplus. The expenses of sale, cost of repossession, and other
122. Lakeland Silex Brick Co. v. Jackson and Church Co., 124 Fla. 347, 168 So.I l l j 1 9 3 6 ) . t
23. note 115 suora.
124. Commercial Credit Co. v. Neel, 91 Fla. 505, 107 So. 639 (1926).
125. Universal Credit Co. v. McKinnon, 106 Fla. 849, 143 So. 778 (1932).
126. Harmon-Hull Co. v. Burton, 106 Fla. 409, 143 So. 298 (1932).
127. White Motor Co. v. Briles, 137 Fla. 268, 188 So. 222 (1939).
128. Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717 (1895).
129. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Gore, 118 Fla. 889, 160 So. 481 (1935).
130. Scotch Mfg. Co. v. Carr, 53 Fla. 480, 43 So. 427 (1907).
131. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides for mandatory public sales if
the buyer has paid more than 50% (§ 19) and allows either party to demand one
if less has been paid (§ 20). Any surplus goes to the buyer; if there is a deficiency the
buyer is still liable in a suit on the contract for the remainder. Massachusetts requires
that 75% be paid before public sale is compulsory. MASS. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 255
see. 11. North Carolina makes such sales compulsory in all instances. N. C. CoDE,
§ 2587 (1927).
132. No obligation exists to account to the buyer, and the buyer is discharged
after repossession. Helton v. Sinclair, 93 Fla. 1121, 1126, 113 So. 568, 570 (1928);
Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677 (1926).
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charges are, by inference, matters to be set up in the answer.18 8  As with
the remedy of self help, replevin affirms title in the seller, thereby discharg-
ing the buyer from the note.8 4 The seller will be precluded from thereafter
maintaining an action to recover the purchase price or any part of it remain-
ing unpaid,'35 or to foreclose his lien, 3 or to foreclose a mortgage on lands
securing the purchase price.' 3 7
Criticism of Election Doctrine
The severity of the election rule has been mitigated somewhat by the
courts' unwillingness to find an election to waive title in every move by
the seller aimed at recovery of the price or the strengthening of his security.
The election doctrine is based on the theory that the act of repossessing
gives rise to a failure of consideration for the buyer's promise to pay the
purchase price. 38  Conversely, a suit for the purchase price converts a
contract of conditional sale into one of absolute sale.139  This doctrine
negatives the expressed written intent of the parties when the contract allows
the seller to have both remedies concurrently, and to be allowed the security
of one as a means of enforcing the other. 40 The buyer's terms are absolute,
and not contingent upon whether the seller repossesses. When a man acts
in consideration of a conditional promise, if he gets the promise he receives
all that he is entitled to by his act, and if, as events turn out, the condition
is not satisfied and the promise calls for no performance, there is no failure
of consideration.' 4' The property interest in a conditional sale is a divided
one. 42 The buyer has the beneficial ownership of the property and may
mortgage, 43 transfer, or insure 44 his interest in the goods as well as main-
taining actions against wrongdoers.'48 The seller, on the other hand, retains
nothing but a naked legal title for the purposes of security. His act of
repossessiong should be treated, not as a termination of the contract in
133. Pardo v. R. S. Evans-Lakeland, Inc., 38 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1949).
134. Hamilton v. Vero Beach Reserve Mtg. Co,, 107 Fla. 65, 144 So 362 (1932).
135. Baer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931).
136. ackson v. H. W. Wade Mfg. Co., 102 Fla. 970, 136 So. 689 (1931).
137. helton v. Sinclair, 93 Fla. 1121, 113 So. 568 (1928)
138. VOLD, SALES 289, 293 (1931).
139. This result could be avoided if the conditional sales contract provided that the
seller could retake, sell at public sale, credit proceeds on the note and, should there still
be a deficiency, foreclose a chattel mortgage given as additional security in the same
contract. Dodson Printers' Supply Co. v. Corbett, 78 Fla. 257, 82 So. 804 (1919);
Mizell Live Stock Co. v.J. J. McCaskill Co., 59 Fla. 322, 51 So. 547 (1910).
140. 2 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 1420, 1426 (2d ed. 1925); Note, 25 IlyAv. L. REv.
462 (1912).
141. 2 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 1420, 1423 (2d ed. 1925).
142. VOLD, SALES 298 (1931).
143. Dame v. C. H. Hanson and Co., 212 Mass. 124, 98 N.E. 583 (1912). See
Annotations, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873 (1912).
144. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hillard, 59 Fla. 590, 52 So. 799 (1910). This rule is
followed in Florida because in this state the risk of loss is on the buyer. United States
v. Greenwood Products Co., 87 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Fla. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1951). The majority view, based on the fact that the risk i on the seller, is contra.
Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Raper, 242 Ala. 440, 6 So.2d 513 (1942).
145. Comment, 17 MINN. L. REv. 66, 72 (1932).
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its entirety, but rather as an act of foreclosing his security interest. 46 Above
all, great practical injustice often results from strict application of the
election doctrine. If the buyer inadvertently neglects to pay one of the
final installments the seller may repossess immediately, 147 and, in Florida,
is under no obligation to return the payments which have been made .4 8
There is also a hardship on the seller. If lie sues for purchase price after
receiving only a small down payment and if the judgment is not satisfied,
he may not thereafter recapture the property. If he elects to repossess but,
unknown to him, the property has deteriorated greatly, he has defeated his
action for the purchase price. In reality the only real ground for support
of this doctrine is the equitable principle against allowing a forfeiture. Or,
as the Florida Supreme Court said in the American Process Co. case, 49 "...
the seller can't collect the price or balance due and keep the property, too."
These practical injustices have led the Florida Supreme Court to open a third
possible remedy to the conditional seller - foreclosure of an equitable lien.
The Lien Remedy
Foreclosure of an equitable lien upon default is a comparatively recent
addition to the remedies of the seller in Florida. As recently as 1926150
there was some reason to believe that the conditional seller in Florida had
only his traditional remedies at law. This belief was based on the supposi-
tion that the seller must pursue one remedy or the other in order to prevent
him from collecting the contract price or balance due and also having the
property by way of repossession. It was assumed that an action on a con-
ditional sales contract concerned personal property only and consequently,
there was no seller's lien for the unpaid purchase money on personal
property such as there was on real estate. If the seller of personal property
desired a lien, he should have taken a chattel mortgage. This reasoning
was justified on the ground that, if one retained title under a conditional
sales contract, he could have no lien, for he could have no lien upon his own
property - the lien would be merged with the title. Today the Florida
courts give equity jurisdiction over the conditional sales contract and estab-
lish a seller's lien which, like the chattel mortgage, can be foreclosed.' 5'
146. VoLD, SALES 289, 291 (1931).
147. Pfeiffer v. Norman, 22 N.D. 168, 133 NAV. 97 (1911); Ballantine, Forfeiturefor Breach of Contract, 5 MmNn. L. REV. 329, 344 (1921).
148. Helton v. Sinclair, 93 Fla. 1121, 1126, 113 So. 568, 570 (1928). Florida rejects
provisions that allow the seller to keep all sums paid in as a forfeiture and, in addition to
recovering possession, to collect all sums remaining unpaid as liquidated damages. Baer v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 101 Fla. 913, 132 So. 817 (1931). Contra: Bedard v.
Ranson, 241 Mass. 74, 134 N.E. 392 (1922).
149. American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So.
942 (1908).
150. Brown, C. J. dissenting in Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677, 689
(1926).
151. Livingston v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 62 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1953);
C. F. C. Corp. v. Spradlin, 38 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1949).
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On this equitable remedy, the doctrine of election also applies 52 and the
conditional seller is barred from pursuing his actions at law.' 5 3
The equitable remedy had been developed in other states as a result
of the unfairness that resulted in the application of the election doctrine.
To avoid a choice between repossession and suits on the purchase price
many states enacted special statutes. These required the seller, after retaking,
to resell and turn over to the buyer any surplus which remained after paying
the costs of the sale and the balance duc on the contract. 54 The unfairness
of the election doctrine also prompted the Florida Supreme Court, in the
outstanding case of Malone y. Meres,5 5 to hold without the benefit of
legislative direction,' 56 that the conditional sales contract created an equit-
able lien in property and afforded the seller an equitable remedy. The
Malone v. Meres ease had been preceded by a case 15 which allowed the
seller, when terms of his contract were such that it could be shown to be
either a mortgage or conditional sale, to "elect" to declare that a chattel
mortgage existed, and to proceed for foreclosure. This allowed the seller,
where the conditional sale contract expressly so provided, to be tantamount
to a chattel mortgage, and to "elect" to proceed on the theory of a chattel
mortgage. 58 This election was binding and operated to vest the title in
the purchaser subject to a lien for the purchase money. As late as t932
equity jurisdiction was denied where the credit instrument was clearly a con-
ditional sale.'"
Later, even where such a provision was not present in the contract,6 0
or without attaching particular significance to it where it did exist,'" the
court permitted the conditional seller to treat his reserved title as a lien
upon the property. The seller would merely allege that "said instrument
is in law a mortgage and the complainant does hereby elect to claim a lien
on said personal property.""'02 He could foreclose his lien and as an inci-
dent thereto, recover a deficiency judgment from the buyer.0 3  Still later,
152. Robertson v. Northern Motor Securities Co., 105 Fla. 644, 142 So. 226 (1932).
153. Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 738, 109 So. 677, 693 (1926).
154. See note 131 supra.
155. 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677, 682 (1926) (".. which method gives the purchaser
some advantages and protection by recognizing and protecting his equity in the property
arising from the payments he has made on the purchase price...").
156. Other jurisdictions beside Florida have allowed such proceedings in the absence
of special statutes. Gigray v. Mumper, 141 Iowa 396, 118 N.W. 393 (1909); McDaniel
v. Chiaramonte, 61 Ore. 403, 122 Pac. 33 (1912).
157. Varn v. Ashbrook, 84 Fla. 626, 94 So. 384 (1922).
158. Refusal to interpret as a mortgage. Mizell Live Stock Co. v. J. J. McCaskill Co.,
59 Fla. 322, 51 So. 547 (1910).
159. Jackson v. H. N1. Wade Mfg. Co., 105 Fla. 560, 142 So. 228 (1932).
160. Reichert v. Nelson, 125 Fla. 347, 169 So. 726 (1936).
161. Kart v. Alexander, 108 Fla. 117, 145 So. 584 (1933).
162. Lawyer's Co-operative Pub. Co. v. McCracken, 111 Fla. 170, 150 So. 248 (1933).
163. A contract that required the foreclosure of a mortgage first, and then a condi-
tional sales contract if there was still a deficiency, is proper. Reichert v. Nelson, 125
Via. 347, 169 So. 726 (1936).
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equity recognized the buyer's right to recover a surplus remaining in the
seller's hands after a resale. 164
Gradually, the seller caime to have a lien under his conditional sales
contract for certain purposes without having to pay lip service to an election
between a mortgage and a conditional sale on the same instrument. 1 5
Interpreting the lien law in its context, with due regard for the purposes
sought to be accomplished thereby, the court held that "lien" was a term
broad enough to include a conditional seller, who, by virtue of his contract,
is considered to have a lien for the unpaid purchase money.1"6 It will be
noted that in his concurring opinion Justice Barns set forth the com-
pletely equitable proposition that more complete justice might be accom-
plished if the special interests of each of the parties were determined.16 7
This observation and the general proposition that a conditional sales con-
tract creates a lien, whether or not it can be interpreted as a chattel
mortgage, has apparently been accepted in Florida. In Livingston v. National
Shawmut Bank of Boston'68 (1953) the court was confronted with pro-
tecting the subordinate interest of a subsequent purchaser. In holding
that the subordinate interest is entitled to participate in any surplus on
resale after a lien foreclosure, the court states, ". . . after all, the purpose of
conditional or retain title contract is to secure the balance due and con-
stitutes a lien upon the property to secure payment."
CONCLUSION
Florida has attempted to alleviate some of the harshness that accom-
panies the "election of remedies" doctrine by applying the "lien" theory
to conditional sales contracts. The appointment of a receiver would mean
that the buyer may lose the goods just as soon as lie would have if the seller
had retaken them, but the seller runs the very great danger of having all
the other creditors of the buyer step in and claim their share. For this
reason the lien remedy will probably be unpopular.
There is by no means complete agreement on the subject of regulation
of the remedies of the seller. Many feel that the remedies for the creditor
should be strengthened and made more effectual. This feeling is undoubt-
edly a reaction to the high pressure salesmanship and advertising programs
forced on the public. The "dollar down and dollar a month" plan can be
a dangerous instrumentality when directed at the quasi-solvent consumer.
The argument that quick and effective creditor remedies would bring to
that group of consumers an awareness of their real financial situation is
met with the rebuttal that the creditor will be more likely not to apply
high pressure selling tactics when he finds that the legal remedies are not
entirely adequate in collecting. This view is an expression of the debtor's
164. Pardo v. R. S. Evans-Lakeland, Inc., 38 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1949).
165. G.F.C Corp. v. Spradlin, 38 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1949).
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. 62 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1953).
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philosophy. It is this writer's view that to restrict the seller to just one of
his remedies when he has a just debt against the buyer is inconsistent with
the economic policy of greater distribution of goods. Statutory remedies
like those employed in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act tend to be too
cumbersome with their periods of redemption and forced sales. But this
Act has proved itself to be, in the overall sense, a fairer remedy between
the parties than that afforded by the election doctrine. Perhaps a revision
of the U.C.S.A. to incorporate some of the advantages of the individual
remedies that do exist from the seller's point of view might be beneficial
to both the seller and buyer when simple financing is needed. At present,
Florida is one of the few states that have enacted no legislation covering this
problem.
ALBERT L. WEINTRAUB.
A HALF CENTURY OF JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
FROM BANANAS TO WATCHES
It is conventional in an international sense to characterize States as
members of a family of nations. The members of this community are con-
sidered to be equal from a legal point of view. Accordingly, a State's co-exist-
ence within this framework is conditioned upon its acceptance of limita-
tions that should be observed in the exercise of its inherent sovereignty,
i.e., unlimited powers. The extent of such limitations is subject to several
dynamic pressures. Among these constraining forces are the changing po-
litical beliefs and agitations within the community of nations and the ex-
ternal problems facing individual States.
The adjustment of such potential powers of States to the exigencies
of a harmonized international community presents a fascinating aspect of
international law as reflected by the internal law of the different countries.
Not only are the constitutional and conflicts of law approaches of these
States affected by this international interplay, but also influenced is their
exercise of legislative and judicial powers.
Viewed in its broadest outlines there appears a surprisingly clear trend
in our country away from what we may call our early legal introversion.
This original unwillingness to deal, in a legal sense, with situations involving
foreign elements changed gradually to the disposition to face such problems
without evidencing too much concern over the possibility of a lack of legis-
lative or judicial jurisdiction in the traditional sense.
It is elementary to say that all jurisdiction as exercised by a country
through its various organs is prima facie territorial. Territorial boundaries
are, under this proposition, identical with the limitations imposed upon all
types of jurisdiction exercised by the States. Such a rigid territorialistic atti-
tude was expressed by Huber to the effect that the laws of every State
